[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Geopolitics: US, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and India
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Please help make the Manifesto better, or accept it, and propagate it!
---------------------------------------------------------------------
IPI_Marker
Dear Friends:=20
Very Interesting discussion of the two diametrically opposite views in =
the US government - one led by Colin Powell and the other by Deputy =
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.=20
One advocates the need for a balance of power between Iraq and Iran, and
=
between India and Pakistan, while the other promotes a radically =
different approach. It's "serial solution" versus "parallel solution."
=
One important element that is missing in Powell's balance of power =
strategy is China. Where and how does China fit into his equation?=20
Here is a quote:=20
> > Wolfowitz regards both Iraq and Pakistan as long-term =20
> > threats to American interests. Clearly, the United States > > has =
relied not only on the Iraq-Iran balance of power but=20
> > also on the Pakistani-Indian balance to protect U.S.=20
> >interests.=20
> >=20
> > What the Wolfowitz camp is apparently arguing is that=20
> > Pakistan has ceased to be a reliable ally, counter-weight=20
> >or even a coherent nation-state. Similarly, Iraq also=20
> > challenges the fundamental interests of the United=20
> > States with or without al Qaeda. Therefore, the logical=20
> > argument is that the United States should shift from a=20
> > balance-of-power strategy to one based on close=20
> > alliances with two major powers -- India and Iran -- whose=20
> > interest is to collaborate with Washington.
> >=20
> > Each would benefit greatly by the destruction of a=20
> > cohesive Iraq and Pakistan. Each is certainly prepared=20
> > to cooperate with the United States to achieve that=20
> > goal. The question -- and this is always the question=20
> > when abandoning a balance-of-power strategy -
> > - is what will hold Iran and India in check following the=20
> > collapse of their adversaries? That is clearly the point that=20
> > Powell and his supporters are making.
> >=20
Please read the full report below.=20
What are the implications of the two approaches so far as India is =
concerned?=20
Ram Narayanan=20
> >=20
> > S T R A T F O R
> >=20
> > THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY
> >=20
> > http://www.stratfor.com
> > ___________________________________________________________________
> >=20
> > 4 December 2001
> >=20
> > THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT - FULL TEXT > > FOR MEMBERS ONLY
> >=20
> > -> ON OUR WEBSITE TODAY FOR MEMBERS ONLY:
> >=20
> > * Iraq, Terrorism and Geopolitics
> > http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0112042020a.htm
> >=20
> > IRAQ, TERRORISM AND GEOPOLITICS
> >=20
> > Summary
> >=20
> > It is no secret that a debate is continuing within the Bush=20
> > administration over whether to expand the anti-terror=20
> > campaign=20
> > from Afghanistan to Iraq. Those advocating an attack on=20
> > Baghdad=20
> > were defeated during the first round of planning, but they=20
> > are=20
> > renewing their arguments following the recent Taliban=20
> > withdrawals. They are also trying to combine an Iraqi=20
> > strategy=20
> > with the model seen in Afghanistan.=20
> >=20
> > Analysis
> >=20
> > Ever since the earliest planning for the response to=20
> > Sept. 11,=20
> > the Iraq question has divided American strategic planners. > > On =
one=20
> > side, elements within the U.S. Defense Department,=20
> > publicly led=20
> > by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, have=20
> > advocated a=20
> > strategy that could be called "the parallel solution." This > > =
plan=20
> > argued that the Afghan campaign had to be embedded=20
> > within a=20
> > broader strategy against not only al Qaeda but also=20
> > against all=20
> > states that had cooperated with the group, chief=20
> > among these=20
> > Iraq.=20
> >=20
> > The parallel solution argued that unless all sanctuary=20
> > for al Qaeda were liquidated at the same time, the=20
> > command structure=20
> > would likely migrate from haven to haven. Any U.S.=20
> > success in=20
> > Afghanistan then would not translate into the destruction > > of al
=
Qaeda.
> >=20
> > The other side was led by U.S. Secretary of State Colin=20
> > Powell,=20
> > who argued for a "serial solution." Powell's primary=20
> > concern was=20
> > that a broad, simultaneous attack on multiple Islamic=20
> > countries=20
> > would produce two unacceptable results.=20
> >=20
> > First, it would shatter the international coalition on which > > the
=
> > United States was absolutely dependent. For example,=20
> > Russian and=20
> > European support are indispensable to the anti-terror=20
> > campaign,=20
> > but neither the Russians nor many European states=20
> > were prepared=20
> > to support a campaign against the Iraqis.
> >=20
> > Second, Powell was aware that one of the primary=20
> > strategic goals=20
> > of al Qaeda was to create the perception that the United=20
> > States=20
> > intended to dominate the Islamic world. Al Qaeda hoped=20
> > Washington=20
> > would adopt a broad strategy that could be portrayed as=20
> > an=20
> > attempt to destroy any Islamic regime that resisted it.=20
> > Powell=20
> > was aware that the situation in Pakistan was particularly=20
> > volatile. Were anti-American sentiment there to boil over, > >
the=20
> > Afghan campaign would become an Afghan-Pakistani=20
> > campaign, with=20
> > enormous strategic implications.
> >=20
> > There was an additional consideration. Mounting a broad-> > based=20
> > campaign against multiple countries, particularly Iraq,=20
> > would=20
> > require months for deploying troops and building up=20
> > supplies.=20
> > Delaying the Afghan campaign in order to wait for a=20
> > buildup=20
> > around Iraq was politically unacceptable and militarily=20
> > unwise.=20
> > Disrupting al Qaeda inside Afghanistan was a more=20
> > pressing=20
> > military requirement, even if it did not completely close=20
> > down=20
> > the migration of planning cells.
> >=20
> > From Washington's perspective, the Afghan campaign is > > now =
drawing=20
> > to a close, assuming the al Qaeda leadership can be=20
> > contained=20
> > inside the country. Although the Taliban has not been=20
> > broken=20
> > decisively, the fact is the United States doesn't care=20
> > much about=20
> > the group, viewing them as a local Afghan issue.=20
> >=20
> > Al Qaeda is the real issue that interests the United=20
> > States.=20
> > Whether Osama bin Laden and his staff are captured or=20
> > killed is=20
> > less important than whether they are contained and=20
> > isolated=20
> > inside Afghanistan. Their survival and isolation might=20
> > actually=20
> > be the ideal solution.=20
> >=20
> > If they were killed or captured, mid-level al Qaeda=20
> > operatives in=20
> > Europe and elsewhere might coalesce and form a new=20
> > command=20
> > structure, as they have undoubtedly been instructed to=20
> > do. The=20
> > flip side, of course, is that events might outstrip U.S.=20
> > plans.=20
> > Bin Laden might already be out of Afghanistan with much > > of
his=20
> > staff, or a shift of command may already have taken=20
> > place.=20
> >=20
> > This is why the Iraqi question has flared again in=20
> > Washington.=20
> > Those who argued for a parallel approach were defeated=20
> > in the=20
> > original planning. But they are now mounting a dual=20
> > attack in=20
> > defense of their position.=20
> >=20
> > First, they are arguing that the Afghan issue has been=20
> > settled=20
> > and therefore the requirements of a serial attack have=20
> > also been=20
> > settled. Second, they are arguing that to the extent=20
> > the Afghan=20
> > issue remains open, it increases the urgency of follow-on=20
> > campaigns in order to prevent the re-establishment of an > > al =
Qaeda=20
> > command cell in another country.
> >=20
> > The Iraqi question is particularly difficult. The strategy=20
> > established in Afghanistan is based on four principles:
> >=20
> > 1) The exploitation of internal tribal, clan and ideological=20
> > schisms to destabilize the regime and create a power=20
> > vacuum to be=20
> > filled, at least notionally, by indigenous forces.
> >=20
> > 2) The use of air power and extremely limited ground=20
> > forces to=20
> > support anti-government elements.
> >=20
> > 3) The use of raiding forces to attempt to destroy=20
> > al Qaeda=20
> > operatives.
> >=20
> > 4) The shifting of post-war reconstruction to the United=20
> > Nations,=20
> > allies and internal forces.
> >=20
> > Under no circumstances has the United States been=20
> > prepared to=20
> > deploy multidivisional forces to occupy and pacify=20
> > Afghanistan.=20
> > This is a strategy that might work well in countries like=20
> > Somalia=20
> > and Yemen, where social fragmentation and clan warfare > >
resemble=20
> > the situation in Afghanistan.=20
> >=20
> > It is also in keeping with the strategic principles the=20
> > administration of U.S. President George W. Bush laid=20
> > down after=20
> > taking office. Bush was deeply concerned that ongoing=20
> > peacekeeping responsibilities were diffusing U.S. power=20
> > across=20
> > multiple non-critical and non-mutually-supporting=20
> > missions,=20
> > leaving the United States exposed to major threats such > > as =
China.=20
> > The strategy used in Afghanistan combined the pressing > > need for
=
a=20
> > military operation with the administration's concerns for=20
> > economy=20
> > of force.
> >=20
> > Iraq represents a different case in two regards. First,=20
> > although=20
> > there is no question that Iraqi intelligence cooperated on=20
> > occasion with al Qaeda, there is a substantial ideological > >
gulf=20
> > between al Qaeda and the Iraqis. Moreover, al Qaeda has > >
worked=20
> > assiduously not to become hostage to any one state.=20
> > Whereas it=20
> > might dominate Somalia or Yemen, it would rapidly=20
> > become hostage=20
> > to Baghdad. Thus, although Iraq is itself a source of=20
> > terrorism,=20
> > it is not likely to be critical to defeating al Qaeda.
> >=20
> > Second, the strategy applied in Afghanistan, although=20
> > useful in=20
> > other countries, would not clearly be applicable to Iraq.=20
> > During=20
> > Desert Storm, a multidivisional, conventional operation=20
> > had to be=20
> > mounted simply to reclaim Kuwait. That force might have > > been=20
> > sufficient to approach Baghdad, but its ability to mount an=20
> > intense campaign would have depended on a willingness > > to
absorb=20
> > substantial casualties, and would have required massive=20
> > resupply=20
> > and reinforcement.=20
> >=20
> > Iraq, in other words, required a commitment of the bulk of=20
> > American military power in 1991. Under current=20
> > circumstances,=20
> > that would raise serious risks elsewhere in the region and > >
the=20
> > world. Therefore, the defenders of an Iraqi strategy have=20
> > tried=20
> > to integrate the Afghan model into an attack plan. As in=20
> > the most=20
> > recent military campaign, the United States would support=20
> > elements opposed to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein=20
> > using air=20
> > power and Special Forces troops.
> >=20
> > The problem with this strategy is it assumes a condition=20
> > that=20
> > does not appear to exist in Iraq: the presence of a=20
> > motivated,=20
> > capable opposition. Hussein's enemies have been foiled=20
> > consistently by Iraqi counter-intelligence. The strategy of=20
> > arming and motivating an anti-Hussein coalition has been=20
> > discussed and attempted several times during the past=20
> > decade. It=20
> > has never worked.
> >=20
> > The advocates of an attack on Iraq understand this. They > > also=20
> > understand that if the principle of such an attack were=20
> > accepted,=20
> > it would by inevitable military logic evolve into a=20
> > conventional=20
> > attack. The planning process would move from covert=20
> > operations,=20
> > to a strategic air campaign to the introduction of=20
> > conventional=20
> > forces.=20
> >=20
> > Powell struck back in interviews last week, making it=20
> > clear that=20
> > military operations against Iraq are not likely at this time. > > He
=
> > is concerned the coalition might not stand the strain,=20
> > and he=20
> > does not believe an attack on Iraq would materially affect > > al =
Qaeda. He also understands the campaign would=20
> > have to evolve into=20
> > a major thrust against Baghdad.=20
> >=20
> > It is not that Powell is concerned about whether Hussein > > can
be=20
> > defeated. Even if the Saudis would not participate in an=20
> > attack=20
> > or allow its soil to be used, the situation in the north,=20
> > where=20
> > Turkish forces operate deep inside Iraqi territory, still=20
> > creates=20
> > strategic opportunities. Moreover, the recent evolution of=20
> > events=20
> > inside Iran raises the possibility of another axis of attack. > > =
And=20
> > that is precisely what worries Powell.
> >=20
> > There were many reasons for not moving on Baghdad in=20
> > 1991, but=20
> > the most important was geopolitical. The foundation of=20
> > U.S.=20
> > strategy in the Persian Gulf always has been=20
> > maintaining the=20
> > balance of power between Iraq and Iran so that U.S.=20
> > interests are=20
> > not threatened by one country having too much power.=20
> >=20
> > The destruction of Hussein's regime 10 years ago=20
> > would have=20
> > created a power vacuum in Iraq not easily filled. It=20
> > would have=20
> > made Iran the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and=20
> > would have=20
> > in effect traded a dangerous Baghdad for a dangerous=20
> > Tehran. It=20
> > was far better for a crippled Iraq to cancel out a crippled=20
> > Iran.=20
> > That same situation exists today. The maintenance=20
> > of the regional=20
> > balance of power requires that Iraqi and Iranian power=20
> > cancel=20
> > each other out.
> >=20
> > Wolfowitz and his colleagues understand this dynamic=20
> > well. It=20
> > would seem they have another geopolitical conception in > > mind.=20
> > Wolfowitz regards both Iraq and Pakistan as long-term=20
> > threats to=20
> > American interests. Clearly, the United States has=20
> > relied not=20
> > only on the Iraq-Iran balance of power but also on the=20
> > Pakistani-Indian balance to protect U.S. interests.=20
> >=20
> > What the Wolfowitz camp is apparently arguing is that=20
> > Pakistan=20
> > has ceased to be a reliable ally, counter-weight or even a=20
> > coherent nation-state. Similarly, Iraq also challenges the=20
> > fundamental interests of the United States with or=20
> > without al=20
> > Qaeda. Therefore, the logical argument is that the=20
> > United States=20
> > should shift from a balance-of-power strategy to one=20
> > based on=20
> > close alliances with two major powers -- India and Iran --=20
> > whose=20
> > interest is to collaborate with Washington.
> >=20
> > Each would benefit greatly by the destruction of a=20
> > cohesive Iraq=20
> > and Pakistan. Each is certainly prepared to cooperate=20
> > with the=20
> > United States to achieve that goal. The question -- and=20
> > this is=20
> > always the question when abandoning a balance-of-power > > strategy
=
-
> > - is what will hold Iran and India in check following the=20
> > collapse of their adversaries? That is clearly the point that=20
> > Powell and his supporters are making.
> >=20
> > The Wolfowitz answer is four-fold. First, whatever the long > > term
=
> > brings, the short-term threat of terrorism is too great. The=20
> > risks from Iraq and Pakistan are already enormous; the=20
> > risks of=20
> > relying on Iran and India are purely hypothetical.=20
> >=20
> > Second, the process of disintegration is a drawn-out=20
> > one. Both=20
> > Iran and India will depend on each other and the United=20
> > States to=20
> > manage the instability on their frontiers.=20
> >=20
> > Third, should the situation prove unacceptable down the=20
> > road, the=20
> > United States always has the option of recreating=20
> > Iraqi and=20
> > Pakistani entities or threats to contain the Iranians and=20
> > Indians.=20
> >=20
> > Finally, India is a commercial republic and Iran is=20
> > evolving that=20
> > way. The United States can provide economic benefits=20
> > to contain=20
> > their appetite for mischief.
> >=20
> > Powell's likely response is that it is far better for relations=20
> > with India and Iran to evolve in the context of current=20
> > geopolitical and strategic arrangements. He undoubtedly > >
reminds=20
> > Wolfowitz that there are other nations -- like=20
> > Saudi Arabia -- to=20
> > be taken into account and that a broad assault on=20
> > multiple=20
> > Islamic countries could come back to haunt the=20
> > United States.=20
> > Islam can be contained and divided, but it cannot be=20
> > overwhelmed.
> >=20
> > What is emerging in the wake of Sept. 11 is a=20
> > profound debate=20
> > over the future of U.S. strategy throughout the Indian=20
> > Ocean=20
> > basin. The logic of U.S. grand strategy is always to=20
> > rely on the=20
> > balance of power, the justification being that it is better to=20
> > use the regional political dynamic than to dissipate=20
> > scarce=20
> > resources in diverse military operations. But this=20
> > argument falls=20
> > apart if the balance of power itself can't be maintained,=20
> > or if=20
> > the cost of the balance of power -- such as=20
> > Iraqi terrorism -- is=20
> > too great.
> >=20
> > In STRATFOR's view, Powell's more traditional=20
> > understanding of=20
> > American interests is likely to prevail, for both logical and=20
> > bureaucratic reasons. Foreign policies usually are=20
> > driven by=20
> > their own internal logic. The debate over how to treat=20
> > Iraq cuts=20
> > to the heart not only of Indian Ocean policy but also=20
> > to how the=20
> > United States carries out its mission globally.
> > ___________________________________________________
------=_NextPart_000_006F_01C17FBA.A15DACC0
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" =
http-equiv=3DContent-Type>
<META content=3D"MSHTML 5.00.2614.3500" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial><BR>Dear Friends: <BR><BR>Very Interesting =
discussion of=20
the two diametrically opposite views in the US government - one led by =
Colin=20
Powell and the other by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. =
<BR><BR>One=20
advocates the need for a balance of power between Iraq and Iran, and =
between=20
India and Pakistan, while the other promotes a radically different=20
approach. It's "serial solution" versus "parallel solution." One =
important=20
element that is missing in Powell's balance of power strategy is =
China.=20
Where and how does China fit into his equation? <BR><BR>Here is a quote:
=
<BR><BR>> > Wolfowitz regards both Iraq and Pakistan as =
long-term =20
<BR>> > threats to American interests. Clearly, the United States
=
>=20
> has relied not only on the Iraq-Iran balance of power but =
<BR>>=20
> also on the Pakistani-Indian balance to protect U.S. <BR>>=20
>interests. <BR>> > <BR>> > What the Wolfowitz camp is =
apparently=20
arguing is that <BR>> > Pakistan has ceased to be a reliable ally,
=
counter-weight <BR>> >or even a coherent nation-state. Similarly,
=
Iraq=20
also <BR>> > challenges the fundamental interests of the United =
<BR>>=20
> States with or without al Qaeda. Therefore, the logical <BR>> =
>=20
argument is that the United States should shift from a <BR>> >=20
balance-of-power strategy to one based on close <BR>> > alliances
=
with two=20
major powers -- India and Iran -- whose <BR>> > interest is to =
collaborate=20
with Washington.<BR>> > <BR>> > Each would benefit greatly =
by the=20
destruction of a <BR>> > cohesive Iraq and Pakistan. Each is =
certainly=20
prepared <BR>> > to cooperate with the United States to achieve =
that=20
<BR>> > goal. The question -- and this is always the question =
<BR>>=20
> when abandoning a balance-of-power strategy -<BR>> > - is =
what will=20
hold Iran and India in check following the <BR>> > collapse of =
their=20
adversaries? That is clearly the point that <BR>> > Powell and his
=
supporters are making.<BR>> > <BR><BR>Please read the full report
=
below.=20
<BR><BR>What are the implications of the two approaches so far as India
=
is=20
concerned? <BR><BR>Ram Narayanan <BR><BR><BR>> > <BR>> > S T
=
R A T F=20
O R<BR>> > <BR>> > THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY<BR>> =
>=20
<BR>> > <A=20
href=3D"http://www.stratfor.com";>http://www.stratfor.com</A><BR>> =
>=20
___________________________________________________________________<BR>&g=
t; >=20
<BR>> > 4 December 2001<BR>> > <BR>> > THE GLOBAL =
INTELLIGENCE=20
REPORT - FULL TEXT > > FOR MEMBERS ONLY<BR>> > =
<BR>> >=20
-> ON OUR WEBSITE TODAY FOR MEMBERS ONLY:<BR>> > <BR>> >
=
* Iraq,=20
Terrorism and Geopolitics<BR>> > <A=20
href=3D"http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0112042020a.htm";>http://w=
ww.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0112042020a.htm</A><BR>>=20
> <BR><BR>> > IRAQ, TERRORISM AND GEOPOLITICS<BR>> > =
<BR>>=20
> Summary<BR>> > <BR>> > It is no secret that a debate is
=
continuing within the Bush <BR>> > administration over whether to
=
expand=20
the anti-terror <BR>> > campaign <BR>> > from Afghanistan to
=
Iraq.=20
Those advocating an attack on <BR>> > Baghdad <BR>> > were =
defeated=20
during the first round of planning, but they <BR>> > are <BR>>
=
>=20
renewing their arguments following the recent Taliban <BR>> > =
withdrawals.=20
They are also trying to combine an Iraqi <BR>> > strategy <BR>>
=
>=20
with the model seen in Afghanistan. <BR>> > <BR>> > =
Analysis<BR>>=20
> <BR>> > Ever since the earliest planning for the response to
=
<BR>>=20
> Sept. 11, <BR>> > the Iraq question has divided American =
strategic=20
planners. > > On one <BR>> > side, elements within the U.S.
=
Defense=20
Department, <BR>> > publicly led <BR>> > by Deputy Secretary
=
of=20
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, have <BR>> > advocated a <BR>> > =
strategy=20
that could be called "the parallel solution." This > > plan
=
<BR>>=20
> argued that the Afghan campaign had to be embedded <BR>> > =
within a=20
<BR>> > broader strategy against not only al Qaeda but also =
<BR>> >=20
against all <BR>> > states that had cooperated with the group, =
chief=20
<BR>> > among these <BR>> > Iraq. <BR>> > <BR>> =
> The=20
parallel solution argued that unless all sanctuary <BR>> > for al
=
Qaeda=20
were liquidated at the same time, the <BR>> > command structure =
<BR>>=20
> would likely migrate from haven to haven. Any U.S. <BR>> > =
success in=20
<BR>> > Afghanistan then would not translate into the destruction
=
>=20
> of al Qaeda.<BR>> > <BR>> > The other side was led by =
U.S.=20
Secretary of State Colin <BR>> > Powell, <BR>> > who argued
=
for a=20
"serial solution." Powell's primary <BR>> > concern was <BR>> =
> that=20
a broad, simultaneous attack on multiple Islamic <BR>> > countries
=
<BR>> > would produce two unacceptable results. <BR>> > =
<BR>>=20
> First, it would shatter the international coalition on which > =
> the=20
<BR>> > United States was absolutely dependent. For example, =
<BR>> >=20
Russian and <BR>> > European support are indispensable to the =
anti-terror=20
<BR>> > campaign, <BR>> > but neither the Russians nor many
=
European=20
states <BR>> > were prepared <BR>> > to support a campaign =
against=20
the Iraqis.<BR>> > <BR>> > Second, Powell was aware that one
=
of the=20
primary <BR>> > strategic goals <BR>> > of al Qaeda was to =
create=20
the perception that the United <BR>> > States <BR>> > =
intended to=20
dominate the Islamic world. Al Qaeda hoped <BR>> > Washington =
<BR>>=20
> would adopt a broad strategy that could be portrayed as <BR>> =
> an=20
<BR>> > attempt to destroy any Islamic regime that resisted it. =
<BR>>=20
> Powell <BR>> > was aware that the situation in Pakistan
was=20
particularly <BR>> > volatile. Were anti-American sentiment there
=
to boil=20
over, > > the <BR>> > Afghan campaign would become an=20
Afghan-Pakistani <BR>> > campaign, with <BR>> > enormous =
strategic=20
implications.<BR>> > <BR>> > There was an additional =
consideration.=20
Mounting a broad-> > based <BR>> > campaign against multiple
=
countries, particularly Iraq, <BR>> > would <BR>> > require
=
months=20
for deploying troops and building up <BR>> > supplies. <BR>> =
>=20
Delaying the Afghan campaign in order to wait for a <BR>> > =
buildup=20
<BR>> > around Iraq was politically unacceptable and militarily =
<BR>>=20
> unwise. <BR>> > Disrupting al Qaeda inside Afghanistan was a
=
more=20
<BR>> > pressing <BR>> > military requirement, even if it =
did not=20
completely close <BR>> > down <BR>> > the migration of =
planning=20
cells.<BR>> > <BR>> > From Washington's perspective, the =
Afghan=20
campaign is > > now drawing <BR>> > to a close, assuming the
=
al=20
Qaeda leadership can be <BR>> > contained <BR>> > inside the
=
country. Although the Taliban has not been <BR>> > broken <BR>>
=
>=20
decisively, the fact is the United States doesn't care <BR>> > =
much about=20
<BR>> > the group, viewing them as a local Afghan issue. <BR>>
=
>=20
<BR>> > Al Qaeda is the real issue that interests the United =
<BR>> >=20
States. <BR>> > Whether Osama bin Laden and his staff are captured
=
or=20
<BR>> > killed is <BR>> > less important than whether they =
are=20
contained and <BR>> > isolated <BR>> > inside Afghanistan. =
Their=20
survival and isolation might <BR>> > actually <BR>> > be the
=
ideal=20
solution. <BR>> > <BR>> > If they were killed or captured, =
mid-level=20
al Qaeda <BR>> > operatives in <BR>> > Europe and elsewhere
=
might=20
coalesce and form a new <BR>> > command <BR>> > structure, =
as they=20
have undoubtedly been instructed to <BR>> > do. The <BR>> >
=
flip=20
side, of course, is that events might outstrip U.S. <BR>> > plans.
=
<BR>> > Bin Laden might already be out of Afghanistan with much =
> >=20
of his <BR>> > staff, or a shift of command may already have taken
=
<BR>> > place. <BR>> > <BR>> > This is why the Iraqi =
question=20
has flared again in <BR>> > Washington. <BR>> > Those who =
argued for=20
a parallel approach were defeated <BR>> > in the <BR>> > =
original=20
planning. But they are now mounting a dual <BR>> > attack in =
<BR>> >=20
defense of their position. <BR>> > <BR>> > First, they are =
arguing=20
that the Afghan issue has been <BR>> > settled <BR>> > and =
therefore=20
the requirements of a serial attack have <BR>> > also been =
<BR>> >=20
settled. Second, they are arguing that to the extent <BR>> > the =
Afghan=20
<BR>> > issue remains open, it increases the urgency of follow-on
=
<BR>>=20
> campaigns in order to prevent the re-establishment of an > >
=
al Qaeda=20
<BR>> > command cell in another country.<BR>> > <BR>> =
> The=20
Iraqi question is particularly difficult. The strategy <BR>> > =
established=20
in Afghanistan is based on four principles:<BR>> > <BR>> > =
1) The=20
exploitation of internal tribal, clan and ideological <BR>> > =
schisms to=20
destabilize the regime and create a power <BR>> > vacuum to be =
<BR>>=20
> filled, at least notionally, by indigenous forces.<BR>> > =
<BR>>=20
> 2) The use of air power and extremely limited ground <BR>> >
=
forces=20
to <BR>> > support anti-government elements.<BR>> > <BR>>
=
> 3)=20
The use of raiding forces to attempt to destroy <BR>> > al Qaeda =
<BR>>=20
> operatives.<BR>> > <BR>> > 4) The shifting of
post-war=20
reconstruction to the United <BR>> > Nations, <BR>> > allies
=
and=20
internal forces.<BR>> > <BR>> > Under no circumstances has =
the=20
United States been <BR>> > prepared to <BR>> > deploy=20
multidivisional forces to occupy and pacify <BR>> > Afghanistan. =
<BR>>=20
> This is a strategy that might work well in countries like <BR>>
=
>=20
Somalia <BR>> > and Yemen, where social fragmentation and clan =
warfare=20
> > resemble <BR>> > the situation in Afghanistan. <BR>>
=
>=20
<BR>> > It is also in keeping with the strategic principles the =
<BR>>=20
> administration of U.S. President George W. Bush laid <BR>> >
=
down=20
after <BR>> > taking office. Bush was deeply concerned that =
ongoing=20
<BR>> > peacekeeping responsibilities were diffusing U.S. power =
<BR>>=20
> across <BR>> > multiple non-critical and =
non-mutually-supporting=20
<BR>> > missions, <BR>> > leaving the United States exposed
=
to major=20
threats such > > as China. <BR>> > The strategy used in =
Afghanistan=20
combined the pressing > > need for a <BR>> > military =
operation with=20
the administration's concerns for <BR>> > economy <BR>> > of
=
force.<BR>> > <BR>> > Iraq represents a different case in =
two=20
regards. First, <BR>> > although <BR>> > there is no =
question that=20
Iraqi intelligence cooperated on <BR>> > occasion with al Qaeda, =
there is=20
a substantial ideological > > gulf <BR>> > between al Qaeda
=
and the=20
Iraqis. Moreover, al Qaeda has > > worked <BR>> > =
assiduously not to=20
become hostage to any one state. <BR>> > Whereas it <BR>> >
=
might=20
dominate Somalia or Yemen, it would rapidly <BR>> > become hostage
=
<BR>> > to Baghdad. Thus, although Iraq is itself a source of =
<BR>>=20
> terrorism, <BR>> > it is not likely to be critical to =
defeating al=20
Qaeda.<BR>> > <BR>> > Second, the strategy applied in =
Afghanistan,=20
although <BR>> > useful in <BR>> > other countries, would =
not=20
clearly be applicable to Iraq. <BR>> > During <BR>> > Desert
=
Storm,=20
a multidivisional, conventional operation <BR>> > had to be =
<BR>> >=20
mounted simply to reclaim Kuwait. That force might have > > been =
<BR>>=20
> sufficient to approach Baghdad, but its ability to mount an =
<BR>> >=20
intense campaign would have depended on a willingness > > to =
absorb=20
<BR>> > substantial casualties, and would have required massive =
<BR>>=20
> resupply <BR>> > and reinforcement. <BR>> > <BR>> =
> Iraq,=20
in other words, required a commitment of the bulk of <BR>> > =
American=20
military power in 1991. Under current <BR>> > circumstances, =
<BR>> >=20
that would raise serious risks elsewhere in the region and > > the
=
<BR>> > world. Therefore, the defenders of an Iraqi strategy have
=
<BR>>=20
> tried <BR>> > to integrate the Afghan model into an attack =
plan. As=20
in <BR>> > the most <BR>> > recent military campaign, the =
United=20
States would support <BR>> > elements opposed to Iraqi President =
Saddam=20
Hussein <BR>> > using air <BR>> > power and Special
Forces=20
troops.<BR>> > <BR>> > The problem with this strategy is it
=
assumes=20
a condition <BR>> > that <BR>> > does not appear to exist in
=
Iraq:=20
the presence of a <BR>> > motivated, <BR>> > capable =
opposition.=20
Hussein's enemies have been foiled <BR>> > consistently by
Iraqi=20
counter-intelligence. The strategy of <BR>> > arming and =
motivating an=20
anti-Hussein coalition has been <BR>> > discussed and attempted =
several=20
times during the past <BR>> > decade. It <BR>> > has
never=20
worked.<BR>> > <BR>> > The advocates of an attack on Iraq =
understand=20
this. They > > also <BR>> > understand that if the principle
=
of such=20
an attack were <BR>> > accepted, <BR>> > it would by =
inevitable=20
military logic evolve into a <BR>> > conventional <BR>> > =
attack.=20
The planning process would move from covert <BR>> > operations, =
<BR>>=20
> to a strategic air campaign to the introduction of <BR>> >=20
conventional <BR>> > forces. <BR>> > <BR>> > Powell =
struck=20
back in interviews last week, making it <BR>> > clear that =
<BR>> >=20
military operations against Iraq are not likely at this time. > >
=
He=20
<BR>> > is concerned the coalition might not stand the strain, =
<BR>>=20
> and he <BR>> > does not believe an attack on Iraq would =
materially=20
affect > > al Qaeda. He also understands the campaign would =
<BR>> >=20
have to evolve into <BR>> > a major thrust against Baghdad. =
<BR>> >=20
<BR>> > It is not that Powell is concerned about whether Hussein =
> >=20
can be <BR>> > defeated. Even if the Saudis would not participate
=
in an=20
<BR>> > attack <BR>> > or allow its soil to be used, the =
situation=20
in the north, <BR>> > where <BR>> > Turkish forces operate =
deep=20
inside Iraqi territory, still <BR>> > creates <BR>> > =
strategic=20
opportunities. Moreover, the recent evolution of <BR>> > events =
<BR>>=20
> inside Iran raises the possibility of another axis of attack. >
=
> And=20
<BR>> > that is precisely what worries Powell.<BR>> > =
<BR>> >=20
There were many reasons for not moving on Baghdad in <BR>> > 1991,
=
but=20
<BR>> > the most important was geopolitical. The foundation of =
<BR>>=20
> U.S. <BR>> > strategy in the Persian Gulf always has been =
<BR>>=20
> maintaining the <BR>> > balance of power between Iraq and =
Iran so=20
that U.S. <BR>> > interests are <BR>> > not threatened by =
one=20
country having too much power. <BR>> > <BR>> > The =
destruction of=20
Hussein's regime 10 years ago <BR>> > would have <BR>> > =
created a=20
power vacuum in Iraq not easily filled. It <BR>> > would have =
<BR>>=20
> made Iran the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and <BR>> >
=
would=20
have <BR>> > in effect traded a dangerous Baghdad for a dangerous
=
<BR>>=20
> Tehran. It <BR>> > was far better for a crippled Iraq to =
cancel out a=20
crippled <BR>> > Iran. <BR>> > That same situation exists =
today. The=20
maintenance <BR>> > of the regional <BR>> > balance of power
=
requires that Iraqi and Iranian power <BR>> > cancel <BR>> >
=
each=20
other out.<BR>> > <BR>> > Wolfowitz and his colleagues =
understand=20
this dynamic <BR>> > well. It <BR>> > would seem they have =
another=20
geopolitical conception in > > mind. <BR>> > Wolfowitz =
regards both=20
Iraq and Pakistan as long-term <BR>> > threats to <BR>> > =
American=20
interests. Clearly, the United States has <BR>> > relied not =
<BR>> >=20
only on the Iraq-Iran balance of power but also on the <BR>> >=20
Pakistani-Indian balance to protect U.S. interests. <BR>> > =
<BR>> >=20
What the Wolfowitz camp is apparently arguing is that <BR>> > =
Pakistan=20
<BR>> > has ceased to be a reliable ally, counter-weight or even a
=
<BR>> > coherent nation-state. Similarly, Iraq also challenges the
=
<BR>> > fundamental interests of the United States with or =
<BR>> >=20
without al <BR>> > Qaeda. Therefore, the logical argument is that
=
the=20
<BR>> > United States <BR>> > should shift from a =
balance-of-power=20
strategy to one <BR>> > based on <BR>> > close alliances =
with two=20
major powers -- India and Iran -- <BR>> > whose <BR>> > =
interest is=20
to collaborate with Washington.<BR>> > <BR>> > Each would =
benefit=20
greatly by the destruction of a <BR>> > cohesive Iraq <BR>> =
> and=20
Pakistan. Each is certainly prepared to cooperate <BR>> > with the
=
<BR>> > United States to achieve that goal. The question -- and =
<BR>>=20
> this is <BR>> > always the question when abandoning a=20
balance-of-power > > strategy -<BR>> > - is what will hold =
Iran and=20
India in check following the <BR>> > collapse of their =
adversaries? That=20
is clearly the point that <BR>> > Powell and his supporters are=20
making.<BR>> > <BR>> > The Wolfowitz answer is four-fold. =
First,=20
whatever the long > > term <BR>> > brings, the short-term =
threat of=20
terrorism is too great. The <BR>> > risks from Iraq and Pakistan =
are=20
already enormous; the <BR>> > risks of <BR>> > relying on =
Iran and=20
India are purely hypothetical. <BR>> > <BR>> > Second, the =
process=20
of disintegration is a drawn-out <BR>> > one. Both <BR>> > =
Iran and=20
India will depend on each other and the United <BR>> > States to =
<BR>>=20
> manage the instability on their frontiers. <BR>> > <BR>> =
>=20
Third, should the situation prove unacceptable down the <BR>> > =
road, the=20
<BR>> > United States always has the option of recreating <BR>>
=
>=20
Iraqi and <BR>> > Pakistani entities or threats to contain the =
Iranians=20
and <BR>> > Indians. <BR>> > <BR>> > Finally, India is
=
a=20
commercial republic and Iran is <BR>> > evolving that <BR>> =
> way.=20
The United States can provide economic benefits <BR>> > to contain
=
<BR>> > their appetite for mischief.<BR>> > <BR>> > =
Powell's=20
likely response is that it is far better for relations <BR>> > =
with India=20
and Iran to evolve in the context of current <BR>> > geopolitical
=
and=20
strategic arrangements. He undoubtedly > > reminds <BR>> > =
Wolfowitz=20
that there are other nations -- like <BR>> > Saudi Arabia -- to =
<BR>>=20
> be taken into account and that a broad assault on <BR>> > =
multiple=20
<BR>> > Islamic countries could come back to haunt the <BR>> =
>=20
United States. <BR>> > Islam can be contained and divided, but it
=
cannot=20
be <BR>> > overwhelmed.<BR>> > <BR>> > What is =
emerging in the=20
wake of Sept. 11 is a <BR>> > profound debate <BR>> > over =
the=20
future of U.S. strategy throughout the Indian <BR>> > Ocean =
<BR>> >=20
basin. The logic of U.S. grand strategy is always to <BR>> > rely
=
on the=20
<BR>> > balance of power, the justification being that it is =
better to=20
<BR>> > use the regional political dynamic than to dissipate =
<BR>> >=20
scarce <BR>> > resources in diverse military operations. But this
=
<BR>>=20
> argument falls <BR>> > apart if the balance of power itself =
can't be=20
maintained, <BR>> > or if <BR>> > the cost of the balance of
=
power=20
-- such as <BR>> > Iraqi terrorism -- is <BR>> > too =
great.<BR>>=20
> <BR>> > In STRATFOR's view, Powell's more traditional =
<BR>> >=20
understanding of <BR>> > American interests is likely to prevail,
=
for both=20
logical and <BR>> > bureaucratic reasons. Foreign policies usually
=
are=20
<BR>> > driven by <BR>> > their own internal logic. The =
debate over=20
how to treat <BR>> > Iraq cuts <BR>> > to the heart not only
=
of=20
Indian Ocean policy but also <BR>> > to how the <BR>> > =
United=20
States carries out its mission globally.<BR>> >=20
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is the National Debate on System Reform. debate@indiapolicy.org
Rules, Procedures, Archives: ../debate/
-------------------------------------------------------------------------